US Aid to Lebanese Army: Revamp or Retreat on Hezbollah?

The United States faces a longstanding dilemma regarding the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). On one hand, US officials view the LAF as the only institution that should disarm Hezbollah and become Lebanon’s sole legitimate security provider. On the other, the US is increasingly uncertain whether the LAF is willing and/or able to carry out this vital mission.

The recent framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel has once again put the LAF’s role in the spotlight. If the LAF seems unwilling or unable to gradually assume full security responsibility over areas Israel has agreed to withdraw from, the agreement is likely to collapse, leading to the resumption of hostilities.

Washington has provided close to $3 billion in assistance to the LAF and the Internal Security Forces since 2006, but skepticism in Congress is becoming more vocal. The problem is this: Washington seems stuck on the fence about whether to abandon or commit to the LAF, and until it picks a side, little is likely to change.

Republican Sen. Jim Risch and Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, the two leads of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have threatened to reconsider US military aid to Beirut if the LAF does not do more to take away Hezbollah’s weapons. “The era of complacency and unconditional bailouts must come to an end,” Risch warned.

Republican Sen. Roger Wicker, the chairman of the influential Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), has urged Congress not to “support the LAF unless it acts to disarm Hezbollah completely — and immediately.” And Sen. Lindsey Graham, chairman of the Senate Budget committee, openly expressed his disappointment with the LAF during a 2025 visit to Lebanon, and singled out its commander, Gen. Rodolphe Haykal, doubting his willingness to “ever rise to the occasion to disarm Hezbollah.”

None of Congress’ concerns are unreasonable, but constantly complaining about the LAF won’t fix the problem. Washington has only two options: either it pulls the plug on LAF assistance altogether because it doesn’t believe that the LAF will ever disarm Hezbollah, or it seriously revamps that assistance to give the LAF a real chance to take on the Iran-backed Shi’ite group.

There is no middle-ground, which US officials must recognize. The status quo of US assistance to the LAF — enough to keep it afloat, but definitely not enough to enable it to disarm Hezbollah — is unsustainable.

US security assistance to Lebanon hasn’t changed for the past two decades. Year in and year out, it has been roughly the same package, both in quality and quantity. Whether that was adequate is debatable, but what’s indisputable is that in today’s historical political-military environment in Lebanon, it certainly is not sufficient. The LAF is being asked to fulfill a task it has never done before but with the same old tools. It’s just not realistic. A new mission, which CENTCOM chief Adm. Brad Cooper has rightly described as a “tall order,” requires new ways.

And these can’t be limited to better equipment and more money — as crucial as it is to financially sustain the LAF and upgrade its Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and offensive aerial strike capabilities. CENTCOM also should provide the LAF with the right kind of training and advising, similar to what it did with Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service, turning that unit into an elite force within the larger Iraqi army capable of combating ISIS.

Good things have happened every time CENCTOM has been given the authority to increase its advisory support to the LAF. The best example was in 2017 in the battle of Fajr Al Jouroud, when the LAF was able to expertly dislodge scores of ISIS fighters from the north with the doctrinal and technical help of American special operators. Hezbollah is not ISIS, for sure — but precisely because it is not, the level of US assistance would have to dramatically increase to meet this much bigger challenge.

Congress has every right to be concerned that even with an overhauled US security assistance program to Lebanon, the Lebanese government (and the LAF) would still be unwilling to disarm Hezbollah. But this is where gradualism can be helpful. There is no need to go all-in on the LAF just yet. You have to test its intentions.

In an April interview with Fox News, Secretary of State Marco Rubio proposed this more realistic approach, saying “we’re working towards establishing…a system that actually works where vetted units within the [LAF] have the training, the equipment, and the capability to go after elements of [Hezbollah] and dismantle them so Israel doesn’t have to do it.”

Those comments were followed up by Cooper in a May hearing. While saying he broadly favored continuing US assistance to the LAF, the CENTCOM chief echoed Rubio that targeted increases to specific mission sets or units might be the way to go. “I believe our commitment could be to provide the funding necessary so that they can do more,” he said.

Notice the nuance in Cooper’s statement, which was deliberate. The idea is that if Washington is less certain about the LAF as a whole taking on the job of disarming Hezbollah, perhaps parts of the force — more capable and better trained — can.

Indeed, this is the only way to assess whether it’s a willingness or a capability issue with the LAF. Beirut can be incentivized to do more on Hezbollah if the LAF is provided with the adequate level of US support. To be clear, there are no guarantees, but it’s definitely worth the risk because the alternative — business as usual — is neither cost-effective nor politically tenable.

In response to Rubio and Cooper’s recommendation, the Pentagon is reportedly exploring options to significantly expand support for the LAF to include equipment, training, and advisory services. Congress still has to sign off on any of this since it has the power of the purse. But if it wants Washington to seize this historical moment in Lebanon and advance long-term US interests in the region, that’s exactly what Congress should do.

Might Shi’ite soldiers leave the LAF because of this new approach? It’s possible, but that’s not necessarily a problem. If it does happen, then we’ll know who really belongs in the LAF and is willing to follow government orders, and who’s just there to collect a paycheck and be loyal to Hezbollah.

Tearing up aid to the LAF might achieve political purposes in Washington, but it would doom the chances of a real and legitimate counter to Hezbollah ever emerging.

Keeping the status quo of US military assistance to Lebanon clearly isn’t working. So, it’s time for a new, targeted approach. Find the units that can be most effective, arm and empower them.

Bilal Y. Saab is senior managing director of TRENDS US, an associate fellow with Chatham House, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council.